"Self-locating Belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem", Adam Elga, Analysis 60(2): 143-147, 2000.
Elga presents an argument for the 'Thirder' view on the Sleeping Beauty problem.
"Sleeping Beauty: reply to Elga", David Lewis, Analysis 61(271): 171-176, 2001.
Lewis responds to Elga's paper, defending the 'Halfer' viewpoint.
"Sleeping Beauty and Self-Location: A Hybrid Model", Nick Bostrom, Synthese 157(1): 59-78, 2007.
The Sleeping Beauty problem is an important test stone for theories about self-locating belief. I argue against both the traditional views on the Sleeping Beauty problem (the thirder and the halfer position). I then introduce a new synthetic view, which combines aspects of both these views. I show that, contrary to initial appearances, this synthetic model does not violate Bayesian kinematics.
"Some problems for Conditionalization and Reflection", Frank Arntzenius, Journal of Philosophy 100(7):356-370, 2003.
Abstract: I will present five puzzles that show that rational people can update their degrees of belief in manners that violate Bayesian conditionalization and Bas van Fraassen's reflection principle. I will then argue that these violations of conditionalization and reflection are due to the fact that there are two as yet unrecognized ways in which the degrees of belief of rational people can develop.
Vineberg, Susan, "Beauty's cautionary tale", 2004.
Discusses Dutch book arguments in relation to the Sleeping Beauty problem..
"Minimizing Inaccuracy for Self-Locating Beliefs", Brian Kierland & Bradley Monton, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70(2): 384-95, 2005.
Argues that we can resolve Sleeping Beauty and other paradoxes by considering the expected squared error of various methods of assigning probabilities. My view on this is that there is a problem in determining the value of this expectation, and that different approaches will calculate different expectations, so that an appeal to the idea that we should minimize expected error is unlikely to resolve the disputes. In a nutshell: it is worse for a method of reasoning to lead to errors in worlds that are more probable than for it to do so in worlds that are less probable. And different methods of reasoning about self-locating belief will assign different probabilities to worlds, and hence disagree about the expected errors that their use would entail.
"A Two-Sided Ontological Solution to the Sleeping Beauty Problem", Paul Franceschi, 2008.
Abstract: I describe in this paper an ontological solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem. I begin with describing the Entanglement urn experiment. I restate first the Sleeping Beauty problem from a wider perspective than the usual opposition between halfers and thirders. I also argue that the Sleeping Beauty experiment is best modelled with the Entanglement urn. I draw then the consequences of considering that some balls in the Entanglement urn have ontologically different properties form normal ones. In this context, considering a Monday-waking (drawing a red ball) leads to two different situations that are assigned each a different probability. This leads to a two-sided account of the Sleeping Beauty problem. On the one hand, the first situation is handled by the argument for 1/3. On the other hand, the second situation corresponds to a reasoning that echoes the argument for 1/2 but that leads however, to different conclusions.
"The Absent-Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses", Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein, Games and Economic Behaviour 20: 121-130, 1997.
The Absent-Minded Driver predates the Sleeping Beauty puzzle and shares some of its puzzling characteristics. The authors summarize and reply to various responses to one of their earlier papers (also published in the same volume) - G&EB vol. 20 is wholly devoted to the Absent-Minded Drivers Paradox).
"A Note On Imperfect Recall", Ken Binmore, Understanding Strategic Interaction. Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten: 51-62, Albers, W. et al.,New York: Springer Verlag, 1996.
Offers some general comments on game theoretic modeling on imperfect recall problem and analyzes an infinitely-repeated version of the Absent-Minded Driver.
"Some "Sleeping Beauty" postings", Nick Wedd (ed.).
Nick Wedd has performed a public service by collecting selected postings on the newsgroup rec.puzzles on the Sleeping Beauty problem, by himself and others, and editing them into an easy-to-read webpage.